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Realism Revisited: Reaffirming the




Legal realism was arguably the most important jurisprudential
movement of the twentieth century. Iconoclastic at its core, it defined
itself in opposition to the legal formalism that had dominated American
legal thought for much of the preceding century. The academics who led
or were otherwise associated with the movement sought to challenge
conventional understandings of legal analysis and judicial decision-
making-in particular, the idea that the law comprised a closed universe
of scientifically-deductible principles that judges only need discover and
apply. In the realist view, legal precedent and deductive reasoning were
useful not because of their supposed contribution to the order and
predictability of the legal system, but because they allowed judges to
rationalize legal decisions reached on other grounds. The goal of legal
realism was to expose this fiction, free the law from the shackles of
precedent and other "scientific" principles, and promote an approach to
legal reasoning that would keep the law "more nearly in step with the
complex developments of modem life."' The fact that jurists today take
many realist precepts for granted suggests that the realist movement
largely succeeded.
Realism emerged more or less contemporaneously with the New Deal-
the series of far-reaching domestic relief measures and economic recovery
legislation enacted as part of the Roosevelt Administration's response to
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the Great Depression.2 Indeed, many realists took leaves of absence from
their academic posts to join the New Deal as administration officials,
policymakers, and government lawyers. Other realist scholars remained in
academia but worked for the New Deal in an advisory capacity. Temporal
and ideational overlap seemed to make realism and the New Deal natural
bedfellows.
Despite their contemporaneity, however, the nature of the relationship
between realism and the New Deal has been woefully underanalyzed and
generally dismissed as exaggerated. There exists in the literature
substantial criticism of the claim that realism and the New Deal were
closely related. This Note seeks to clarify and refine these existing
understandings about the relationship between legal realism and the New
Deal, and demonstrate the New Deal's formative role in the development
of realist jurisprudence. The core thesis is that the New Deal is central to
legal realism and should be used to define it. More specifically, the New
Deal legal agenda should be viewed as realism in action-the operational
complement to the theoretical exposition provided by realist academics.3
While the main tenets of realism regarding legal rules and the importance
of social realities may have been developed in scholarship primarily
focused on private law, it was the deployment of these insights during the
New Deal for public law that ultimately rounds out the picture of realist
jurisprudence. Thus, a complete understanding of realism can only be
achieved by examining the application of realist thought in the context of
the New Deal policy agenda.
The literature attacking the "common assumption"4 that realism and the
New Deal were closely related does so in one of three non-mutually
exclusive ways. The first thesis, which might be called the "no substantive
effect" or "limited impact" thesis, holds that legal realism's focus on
private law prevented it from making any substantive contribution to the
New Deal's transformative ideas on public law.5 In this view, the politico-
intellectual milieu of the 1930s may have allowed realism and the New
Deal to overlap in some amorphous sense, but not to the point where such
overlap was anything more than a coincidence of ideas. The second main
critique might be called the "sociological jurisprudence redux" thesis. This
holds that realism is best viewed primarily as an extension of the
2. See generally ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL (2003).
3. This proposition has been vastly underanalyzed in the literature. See, e.g., N.E.H. HULL,
ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 261 (1997);
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 130 (1986). But see ROBERT JEROME
GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK'S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW 68-101
(1985) (suggesting ways in which legal realism influenced Jerome Frank's work as a New Deal
lawyer).
4. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 153 (1995).
5. DUXBURY, supra note 4, at 157-58 ("The conservatism of legal realism rested ultimately in the
fact that it remained a private law jurisprudence in a public law world. The problems of modem
administrative government never supplemented its original critical agenda.").
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sociological jurisprudential movement that preceded it, rather than as a
distinct theoretical movement in its own right.6 The implication is that
there is little about the relationship between the New Deal and legal
realism that could not be said of the relationship between the New Deal
and sociological jurisprudence. Thus, realism drew no independent
definitional substance from the New Deal. The final critique, and one
closely related to the first, is that realism waned as many of its most
prominent theorists went to Washington to work for the New Deal.7
Realist theory, in this view, gave way to the exigencies of governance.
Instead of viewing the work of realist academics-turned-policymakers as
key to understanding what realism was about, this critique suggests a clear
delineation between realism as jurisprudential thought and the New Deal
as political philosophy.
There is, of course, a degree of truth in each of these critiques, but
overall they vastly understate the extent to which legal realism and the
New Deal were mutually constitutive. Indeed, it was the exigencies of
governance during the New Deal that allowed realism to reach its full
expression. To the extent that claims to the contrary appear convincing,
this likely reflects the relative lack of comprehensive analysis on the
nature of the New Deal-legal realist relationship, rather than the strength
of the counterclaim. This paper seeks to provide one such analysis and
reaffirm the centrality of the New Deal in realist jurisprudence.
The Note proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of legal
realism, focusing on its four key tenets. This sets the stage for
understanding how realism helped advance the New Deal policy agenda,
and in turn, how the New Deal helped define realist jurisprudence. Part I
examines the intersection of legal realism and the New Deal, and argues
that the interrelationship was more than a coincidence of ideas. This part
demonstrates that the New Deal was the platform through which the
realists sought to "put realism to work." 8 Part III then analyzes the
6. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169-71, 209 (1992) ("[Hlistorians have been misled into looking for sharper
distinctions between sociological jurisprudence and Legal Realism than are justified.... For most
purposes, ... Legal Realism needs to be seen primarily as a continuation of the reformist attack on
orthodox legal thought."); cf RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN
THE NEW DEAL 135 (1995) ("Some students of legal realism situate its development in the context of a
rather straightforward progression of jurisprudential ideas in 'revolt against formalism,' or, in what is
only another version of this tradition, as part of a series of continuities and breaks with past 'classical'
legal thought.").
7. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 4, at 158 ("Rather than emerge as the jurisprudence of the New
Deal, realism was outstripped by political and legal developments, and when various realists left their
faculties to head for Washington they did so not out of a desire to put experimental jurisprudence into
practice, but in search of promising career prospects."); cf G. Edward White, Recapturing New Deal
Lawyers, 102 HARV. L. REV. 489, 514 (1988) ("Graduates of law schools in the 1930's. . . did not
necessarily join the New Deal because they had been imbued with Realist messages, nor did the
existence of New Deal programs necessarily provide a stimulus for the articulation of Realist
jurisprudential theories.").
8. KALMAN, supra note 3, at 130.
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landmark New Deal Supreme Court case Wickard v. Filburn to illustrate
the application of realism in judicial decision-making. As will be shown,
Justice Robert Jackson's opinion in the case provides an especially
compelling portrait of legal realism's impact on the New Deal and the
New Deal's role in giving realist jurisprudence an "operational"
component. A brief conclusion follows Part II,
I. DEFINING LEGAL REALISM
Legal realism emerged in earnest as a distinct school of American
jurisprudential thought in the late 1920s and 1930s.9 Acting both as a
complement to the school of sociological jurisprudence that preceded it
and as an attack against some of that movement's main assumptions, legal
realism embodied a more fundamental critique of orthodox views on legal
reasoning than had been advanced up to that point.' ° This intellectual
assault was wide-ranging and not necessarily coordinated among the
scholars associated with the realist movement." Yet there are common
themes in realist writings, and a shared intensity of passion by those
writing on behalf of a realist approach to law, which make it possible to
identify the characteristics of realism most essential to defining the
movement.' 2 In particular, there are four features of realism that provide
insight into how realists believed that lawyers and judges should analyze
legal problems and decide cases. These features provided the conceptual
overlap that allowed realist jurisprudence not only to advance the New
Deal, but also to achieve further expression through it. Before turning to
the substance of that interrelationship, we begin first with an examination
of realism's core characteristics.
A. Rule Skepticism
The first and most fundamental feature of the realist critique was a
distrust of traditional legal rules and concepts as effective guidance for
deciding cases. This skepticism was shared almost universally among
scholars associated with the realist movement. 13 For example, in one of his
9. For two of the earliest theoretical treatments of legal realism, see Max Radin, Theory of
Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, II A.B.A. J. 357 (1925); and Walter W. Cook, Scientific
Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303 (1927).
10. See HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 169-92; G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence
to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV.
999 (1972).
11. See Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REv. 1233, 1233-34 (1931) ("There is no school of realists. There is no likelihood that there will be
such a school. There is no group with an official or accepted, or even with an emerging
creed.... They are related, says [Jerome] Frank, only in their negations, and in their skepticisms, and
in their curiosity.").
12. Llewellyn himself identified a "common core" of elements of realist jurisprudence. Llewellyn,
supra note 11, at 1250.
13. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 199-200; SHAMIR, supra note 6, at 143-44; AMERICAN LEGAL
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early landmark articles outlining the contours of realism, Karl Llewellyn
highlighted "a distrust of the theory that traditional prescriptive rule-
formulations are the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions"
as one of the "characteristic marks of the movement."' 4 Realists believed
that the so-called legal science approach to law established in the
nineteenth century by Christopher Langdell during his time as Dean of
Harvard Law School was too rigid and formulaic to serve as the basis of
sound legal reasoning. Langdell had argued that law could be reduced to a
few fundamental rules and principles that judges need only discern from
previous cases and deductively apply to new facts.' 5 This conceptual (or
"formalist") approach was the dominant paradigm for legal analysis at the
time of the realist emergence and served as the target that helped define
the movement. 1
6
The formalist conception of law as a "closed system," in which higher
legal principles existed apart from outside influences, ensured that the
classical approach espoused by Langdell was a distinctly apolitical one. 7
To ensure law's "purity" and internal consistency, Langdell and his
successors emphasized that legal rules must remain free from political
whims and policy concerns. ' 8 The categorization and abstraction of legal
principles characteristic of the legal science approach was thought to be
critical to the integrity of the legal system.' 9 The realists, however,
believed that policy considerations were, and indeed should be, at the
center of legal reasoning. Their first priority, then, was to expose
Langdell's rules, and their abstractions, as fictions.
Realists considered an attack on the rigidity of legal rules to be a critical
step toward better legal decision-making and a more accurate
understanding of what courts were actually doing when they decided
cases.2" For realists, the black-letter rules that had been pulled from
opinions and compiled in casebooks and treatises were only useful to the
extent that they might provide a starting point for analyzing a new legal
issue, or where the facts of a new case closely tracked the facts underlying
the precedent-the rules had no value in the abstract as rules per se.2 The
REALISM 166 (William W. Fisher Ill et al. eds., 1993); Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 1237.
14. Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 1237-38.
15. KALMAN, supra note 3, at 11.
16. Id.; Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809 (1935); Max Radin, Legal Realism, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 824 (1931).
17. JUSTIN ZAREMBY, LEGAL REALISM AND AMERICAN LAW 14 (2014).
18. DUXBURY, supra note 4, at 22-24; ZAREMBY, supra note 17, at 9-10, 14.
19. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 4, at 24 (noting that the Restatement projects initiated by the
American Law Institute in the early 1920s to categorize legal rules "bestowed professional credibility
on the Langdellian idea that the basic principles of the law are simply there to be discovered by logical
analysis and thereafter reported in a fashion which reflects their 'real'-meaning unambiguous-
nature").
20. See,e.g.,id.at 119-25.
21. Radin, supra note 16, at 827 ("A robust realism, then, need not fear a syllogism, or even deny
its limited value in determining as well as setting forth judicial results, and it can relegate
2015]
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problem, as the realists saw it, was that rules that were supposed to serve
as the foundation of "scientific" reasoning had become "unreal by life
having left them behind. ' 22 No legal rule, no matter how longstanding,
should be applied to a new legal problem without checking the rule against
the underlying facts. 23 Felix Cohen, a prominent realist, captured this
sentiment well in a seminal article in the Columbia Law Review:
Our legal system is filled with supernatural concepts, that is to say,
concepts which cannot be defined in terms of
experience.... Against these unverifiable concepts modem
jurisprudence presents an ultimatum. Any word that cannot pay up
in the currency of fact, upon demand, is to be declared bankrupt,
and we are to have no further dealings with it.... In other
words... [a]ll concepts that cannot be defined in terms of the
elements of actual experience are meaningless.24
For the realists, the facts of the case, rather than a menu of pre-existing
black letter rules, should play the key role in legal decision-making.25 The
realists decried formalism's focus on achieving "doctrinal synthesis" by
force fitting legal rules onto dissimilar factual circumstances. Karl
Llewellyn, for example, wrote that efforts to maintain a well-defined,
closed universe of rules tended to "distort all vision of the underlying
reality" because such a synthesis "must always be in conceptual terms, in
classes, in supposed uniformities, inclusive, exclusive."2 6 In this view,
"the battle ground of such synthesis ... must always be the marginal and
even pathological case which 'tests' the sweeping generalization., 27 For
Max Radin, another prominent figure in the realist movement, this meant
that judges needed to "keep themselves aware that they are required to
base their judgments on unique events in which non-interchangeable
individual human beings are concerned., 28 Rules tended to be "verbal
excuses" that obscured the fact that courts were grouping disparate things
together. 29 Attention to the facts would ensure that judges focused on the
human behavior and societal interests that the law was being asked to
conceptualism to its place without running the risk of being effaced or pushed aside."); Herman
Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 215, 228 (1928) ("Neither deduction nor
induction can do more than suggest the competing analogies and to indicate promising directions for
trial and error testing.").
22. Oliphant, supra note 21, at 224.
23. Llewellyn, supra note 1 I, at 1223 ("[The realists] want to check ideas, and rules, and formulas
by facts, to keep them close to facts. They view rules, they view law, as means to ends; as only means
to ends; as having meaning only insofar as they are means to ends.").
24. Cohen, supra note 16, at 823, 826.
25. Karl Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 751
(1931) ("Overwhelming... is the conviction that broad forms of words are chaos, that only in close
study of the facts salvation lies.").
26. Id. at 750.
27. Id.
28. Radin, supra note 16, at 824.
29. Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15 (1934).
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Realist skepticism of the value of legal rules stemmed from the realists'
belief that the reification of these rules had forced judges into categorical
thinking-that is, making either-or decisions devoid of the nuance
demanded by the unique case in front of them. 3I For the realists, even
when courts attempted to preserve the appearance that they were engaged
in a simple application of a well-established rule to the present case, the
reality was much different.32 For example, Lon Fuller and William
Purdue, writing in the Yale Law Journal in 1936 and 1937, argued that
judges should more forthrightly recognize a "reliance interest" in contracts
as a ground on which to award contract damages.33 Instead of explicitly
recognizing this interest, courts up to that point had confined the legal
analysis in breach of contract cases to a narrow, "normal" rule that
awarded a promisee the value of expected profits, but did not consider
other possible measures of recovery. For Fuller and Purdue, limiting
assessment of contract damages to expectation damages forced contract
claims analysis into an arbitrary, all-or-nothing approach that denied
damages to deserving plaintiffs. By adopting a more "flexible scheme of
legal sanctions" that included the reliance interest, Fuller and Purdue
believed that courts could more effectively and fairly effectuate the goals
of contract law. 34
Thurman Arnold's critique of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts is
another example of the rule skepticism characteristic of the realist
movement. Writing in the Columbia Law Review in 1931, Arnold
criticized the Restatement's attempt to "ingeniously twist[]" ancient legal
rules for the sake of "preserv[ing] as far as possible all of the logical
machinery of the law.",35 For Arnold, this was an unwarranted elevation of
the conceptual approach, of form over substance. The proper approach
was to "frankly recognize[] that no closed philosophical system of the law
of trusts is possible, because the cases included under the term are too
unlike."36 Instead of clinging to the notion that rules have value in the
abstract, categorization efforts such as the Restatement should determine
"which formulae and rules are useful in deciding cases, and which are
useless." 37 For Arnold, as for other realists, the abstractions considered
critical to an orderly systematization of the law prevented an inquiry into
30. Cf id. at 8 (arguing that when there is doubt about how to classify the facts of a case, it is the
classification of the facts ultimately adopted, rather than the legal rule, that will decide the outcome).
3 1. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 199-206.
32. Radin, supra note 16.
33. Lon L. Fuller & William R. Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE
L. 52 (1936); Lon L. Fuller & William R. Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46
YALE L.J. 373 (1937).
34. Fuller & Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, supra note 33, at 419.
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the appropriateness of the abstractions to actual situations. As a result, the
rules obscured reality in a way that became "an impediment to intelligible
judicial speech, and a trap for the unwary judge or lawyer."38 Deference to
legal abstractions prevented a more rational classification of the law of
trusts that would have better reflected reality.
B. Consequentialism and the Functional Approach
The second core feature of legal realism was a belief that questions of
law should be resolved with a view to the social consequences that would
flow from a particular ruling. This was in many ways a corollary to the
realist distrust of traditional legal rules and its insistence on the
substitution of facts for concepts in legal analysis. The idea was that courts
should depend primarily on consciously articulated social policies for
guidance in decision-making.39 For example, in Some Realism About
Realism, Llewellyn explained that one of the central ideas of the realist
movement was "[tjhe conception of law as a means to social ends and not
as an end in itself; so that any part needs constantly to be examined for its
purpose, and for its effect, and to be judged in the light of both and of their
relation to each other."4 Other realist scholars expressed similar
sentiments. Judges are realists, according to Radin, "when they are aware
of what the results of their judgment are likely to be, both to the concrete
human beings who have evoked it and to others who may be governed by
their example."'" For Felix Cohen, the realistic judge would approach the
"delicate practical task of social adjustment" by "frankly assess[ing] the
conflicting human values that are opposed in every controversy [and]
apprais[ing] the social importance of the precedents to which each claim
appeals. '42 Questions of social policy would be treated "not as an
emergency factor in legal argument but rather as the gravitational field
that gives weight to any rule or precedent. 43
Legal historians have used the phrase "purposive adjudication" to
describe this component of the realist program. 44 For the realists, applying
legal rules through a purely deductive exercise did not produce results that
reflected social reality. Courts instead needed to first discern the purpose
of those rules and use that purpose as the point of departure for legal
reasoning. It was the purpose of a rule, rather than its logical force, that
ultimately defined the value of the rule as a guide for decision-making.
The task of the realist judge was "not to find the preexisting but previously
38. Id. at 800.
39. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 13, at 167.
40. Llewellyn, supra note 1I, at 1236.
41. Radin, supra note 16, at 824.
42. Cohen, supra note 16, at 842.
43. Id. at 834.
44. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 13, at 167.
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hidden meaning of the terms in [legal] rules; it [was] to give them a
meaning" that would reach the desired result.45 This kind of approach
would ensure that the law developed in a way that "kept more nearly in
step with the complex developments of modem life.",46 Walter Cook, a key
figure in the realist movement, framed the issue this way:
The... situation confronting the judge in a new case being what it
is, it is obvious that he must legislate, whether he will or no. By
this is meant that since he is free so far as compelling logical
reasons are concerned to choose which way to decide the case, his
choice will turn out upon analysis to be based upon considerations
of social or economic policy.... To do this, however, the judge
will need to know two things: (1) what social consequences or
results are to be aimed at; and (2) how a decision one way or other
will affect the attainment of those results.47
The realist conception of law as turning on questions of social policy
bears obvious resemblance to a defining feature of sociological
jurisprudence, a philosophy of law expounded by the distinguished legal
scholar Roscoe Pound in the early twentieth century, most notably in a
series of articles in the 1911 and 1912 issues of the Harvard Law
Review. 48 The shared view stemmed partly from the common influence of
the Progressive era on both jurisprudential movements.49 The convergence
was not lost on the realists. In 1925, Llewellyn wrote an unpublished essay
in which he acknowledged Pound's considerable influence on the
development of realist thinking.5" Legal historian Natalie Hull argues that,
at this point in time, "Llewellyn's view of Realistic Jurisprudence almost
totally coincided with Pound's description of Sociological
Jurisprudence."'" Morton Horwitz similarly has suggested that the
intensity of Llewellyn's debate with Pound has misled historians "into
looking for sharper distinctions between sociological jurisprudence and
Legal Realism than are justified."52
Despite some baseline similarities, however, it is clear that the realists
did not consider legal realism to be merely sociological jurisprudence
45. Cook, supra note 9, at 308.
46. Oliphant, supra note 1, at 20.
47. Cook, supra note 9, at 308.
48. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence 1, 24 HARV. L. REV.
591 (1911); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence I1, 25 HARv. L.
REV. 140 (1911); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence I11, 25 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 512 (1912) ("The main problem to which sociological jurists are addressing themselves
today is to enable and to compel law-making, and also interpretation and application of legal rules, to
take more account, and more intelligent account, of the social facts upon which law must proceed and
to which it is to be applied.").
49. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 171.
50. DUXBURY, supra note 4, at 75.
51. N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence: A Prequel to the
Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Legal Realism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1302, 1314.
52. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 171.
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recast under a new name. Even while sharing a general belief that changes
in the demands of modem society should help drive interpretation of the
law, the differences between sociological jurisprudence and realism were
not a matter of semantics or emphasis, but of substance. In particular,
realism, while stressing the social purposes of law, also emphasized that
there were no sacrosanct "traditional values" that should be treated as
"authoritative starting points for legal reasoning"--a key feature of
sociological jurisprudence.53 Whereas Pound stressed what he saw as a
constructive role of the "ideal element" for scoping legal analysis-a
reference to certain political and ethical ideals of society that should guide
judicial decisions-realists called for the "temporary divorce of Is and
Ought" as a way to clarify the ends the law should be expected to serve.5 4
For the realists, "received ideals"-ideals that Pound suggested "may be
so generally established.., as to be a form of law in the strictest
sense" 55-- contained normative baggage that could distort any inquiry into
the viability of a legal rule.56 Instead, the realists embraced a social
philosophy that "reject[ed] many of the accepted foundations of the
existing... order."57 In the realist view, rigid adherence to an "ideal
element" could be just as detrimental to sound legal reasoning as blind
deference to abstract legal principles.
In addition to their skepticism of the sociological jurists' emphasis on
"received ideals" and "traditional values" as authoritative guides for legal
reasoning, realists also believed that Pound and his adherents placed too
much faith in the abstract legal categories that they purported to attack.
For example, Llewellyn argued that the existing body of legal rules was
"central to [Pound's] thinking about law," and that Pound was too willing
to indulge traditional techniques for developing and applying legal
principles.58 For Llewellyn, Pound's insistence that legal categories had an
important systematizing and ordering role to play in framing legal
questions exposed him as "a man partially caught in the traditional
precept-thinking of an age that is passing."59 Jerome Frank, a leading
realist and Llewellyn's comrade-in-arms in the attack against formalism,
similarly charged that Pound had "never completely freed himself of rule-
fetishism"6 and was "reluctant to relinquish entirely the age-old legal
myths.",61 For the realists, this deference to doctrine went against the
53. Roscoe Pound, The Ideal Element in American Judicial Decision, 45 HARV. L. REv. 136, 147
(1931).
54. Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 1236.
55. Pound, supra note 53, at 136.
56. Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 1236-37.
57. Id. at 1237.
58. Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 434
(1930); see also Cook, supra note 9, at 308.
59. Llewellyn, supra note 58, at 434.
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essence of a functional approach to law and unduly limited the extent to
which legal questions could be resolved with an eye toward the social
policies implicated. It also suggested that sociological jurisprudence, for
all its insights, was not up to the task of bringing about the reconciliation
of law with social effects.62
C. Social Science and Realism's Search for Reality
The realist belief that sociological jurisprudence was insufficiently
oriented to social consequences points to a third feature of legal realism: a
strong commitment to applying a social scientific approach to the study of
law. Here, again, the realists viewed themselves as carrying out an
unfulfilled promise of Pound.6 3 The idea was that if a functional approach
to law required constant reexamination of the fit between law and society,
then legal analysis required empirical studies of social behavior to assess
the interplay between law and human conduct.' Such studies would be
the only way to ascertain whether the law was having the intended social
effect. These studies would also provide the most reliable means of
uncovering the facts the realists sought to use to displace the rigid
categories characteristic of the formalist approach.
This sentiment was widely shared among realists.65 Herman Oliphant,
for example, called for "[a] systematized study, deliberately focused
toward getting an adequate knowledge of the entire social structure as a
functioning and changing but coherent mechanism."' 66 This would be
accomplished by "[a] return to a more rigorous and enlightened
empiricism in the study and making of law" rooted in social scientific
methods, particularly the use of statistics. 67 In his 1927 article Scientific
Method and the Law, realist Walter Cook argued that "a scientific
approach to the study of law will demand observation and study of the
actual structure and functioning of modem social, economic, and political
life" so that judges could rely on empirical data rather than "hit-or-miss
information."68 To accomplish this, the judge "will need to call upon the
other social sciences" such as economics, psychology, and sociology.69
Similarly, Max Radin stressed that for the law to secure "realistic results,"
legal reasoning needed to be rooted in the "instrumentalities" of "statistics,
62. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 174.
63. Id. at 209 ("This realist turn to social science research was a direct extension of pre-war
Progressive sociological jurisprudence.").
64. See DUXBURY, supra note 4, at 80; AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 13, at 233.
65. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 181 ("The core group on Llewellyn's list [of realists]-Clark,
Moore, Oliphant, Yntema, Douglas, and Cook-were all deeply involved in the relationship between
law and the social sciences.").
66. Oliphant, supra note 21, at 226.
67. Id. at 230.
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mathematics, terminology, [and] psychology. ' 70 Non-realists, argued
Radin, had misused these methods, leading to "confusion and indirection"
in the law.7
The realist commitment to integrating law and the social sciences
manifested itself in a wide range of empirical studies.7 One example was
an early 1930s study spearheaded by the then Dean of Yale Law School,
Charles E. Clark, with critical research conducted by prominent realists
William 0. Douglas and Thurman Arnold.73 The study was intended to
"illustrate and test the efficiency of our federal rules of procedure and our
general methods of administering justice" in the federal courts by
collecting "concrete factual, statistical information" on "congestion" in the
system.74 Researchers involved in the study collected information from
various federal districts on the types of cases heard, the jurisdiction
invoked, the method of termination of the cases, and the character of the
parties involved. Clark believed that this data would help resolve "certain
differences on points of fact concerning the actual operation of the present
[jurisdictional] rules," a resolution he considered a prerequisite to any
informed examination of efforts to reform those rules.75 In an article
highlighting one of the study's most topical discoveries, Clark presented
no less than nine tables of statistics to show that a proposed bill that would
treat a foreign corporation doing business in a state as a citizen of that
state for diversity jurisdiction purposes "seem[ed] not only a reasonable
compromise, but one also supported by inherent arguments of equity and
fairness."76 For Clark, the statistics exposed the strength and weaknesses
of otherwise unexamined policy assumptions and helped clear a path to
more objective analysis. 77
The realist emphasis on empirical social science never quite lived up to
the lofty expectations set by its proponents. Morton Horwitz maintains
that "[v]irtually all [legal historians] agree that most of the social science
research projects undertaken by Realists were either trivial attempts to
prove the obvious through pseudo-scientific methodology or else nafve
and misconceived efforts at social science research. ' 78 Even research
studies conducted by prominent realists at the Johns Hopkins Institute of
Law-an institute founded specifically for the purpose of supporting the
70. Radin, supra note 16, at 827.
71. Id. at 826-27.
72. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE
(1995).
73. ld. at 81-114.
74. John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale
Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459, 501 (1979). See generally Charles Clark, Diversity of Citizenship
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 19 A.B.A. J. 499 (1933).
75. Schlegel, supra note 74, at 499.
76. Clark, supra note 74, at 503; Schlegel, supra note 74, at 507-08.
77. Clark, supra note 74, at 502-03.
78. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 210.
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empirical study of law-amounted to "little more than head counting. 79
Karl Llewellyn himself ultimately came to criticize the crude empiricism
of many of the projects undertaken by his colleagues, remarking that "I
read all the results, but I never dug out what most of the counting was
good for."80 Some moderate successes aside, there was a general sense
that in many of these studies "[sitatistics were collected without the
benefit of tentative hypotheses to render their collection meaningful [and]
figures were amassed without reference to any particular problem to be
solved."81 The realists, it seemed, were replacing "rule-fetishism" with
"fact-fetishism."
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the realist campaign to integrate law
and empirical social science was an important and, perhaps surprisingly,
enduring part of the realist legacy. While the studies themselves may
largely have failed to produce much in the way of actionable data, "the
realists' affair with the social sciences set the agenda for American
jurisprudence of the future."82 Following realism's foray into empirical
research, American legal thought largely embraced the interdisciplinary
study of law. The impact was felt not only in post-realist legal scholarship,
but also in post-realist changes in legal education. Duxbury, for example,
notes that "[t]he originality of legal realism was that it set the scene for the
emergence of jurisprudential sub-disciplines of the 'law and' variety."83
The Yale and Columbia Law Schools began to introduce textbooks of
"cases and materials"-which included statutes, annotations, and social
science statistics, in addition to appellate opinions-to ensure that the law
was studied with an eye to social facts.84 This trend continued long after
the realist social science research agenda had been abandoned. Realism
thus marked the official marriage of social science and law, a marriage
that persists today. 85
D. Judicial Modesty
The fourth and final feature of legal realism was a belief that judicial
decision-making required a degree of deference to legislative purpose and
administrative expertise. Admittedly, judicial restraint did not occupy
realist writers to the same extent as other topics-rule-skepticism, the
virtues of a consequentialist approach, and an appeal to the social sciences
all featured much more prominently. And even when judicial restraint was
discussed, consensus on the point was by no means universal.86 Still,
79. KALMAN, supra note 3, at 32; SCHLEGEL, supra note 72, at 147-210.
80. KALMAN, supra note 3, at 33.
81. Id.
82. DUXBURY, supra note 4, at 92.
83. Id. at 92 n.129.
84. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 13, at 273.
85. DUXBURY, supra note 4, at 92.
86. Max Radin, to take a prominent example, argued that the intent of the legislature was either
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judicial restraint was an idea expressed by, and more often implicitly
endorsed by, key realist figures.8 7 Furthermore, even if many realists did
not voice an opinion on judicial restraint, it is an approach to public law
that is not only quite consistent with, but naturally flows from, realism's
other tenets.
To the extent that realism supported the idea of judicial deference
toward legislative purpose, this almost certainly stemmed from the
movement's functional orientation: if legal rules could only be effectively
applied by keeping in view the social purposes served by those rules, then
there needed to be a reliable way to ascertain those purposes in the first
instance. The answer, for many realists, was to understand the policy goals
the legislature sought to address when passing legislation. Since social and
economic conditions were in constant flux, it was the legislature, rather
than the judiciary, that was the institution most attuned to the public
purposes behind the law.88 The legislature had the resources and expertise
for "extended investigation" into the social problems the law sought to
address, and had "unlimited powers of choice between competing devices"
for advancing the public interest.8 9 Thus, legislative history and legislative
processes would in many cases provide "accurate and compelling guides
to legislative meaning," which would help ensure sound legal reasoning."9
Ignoring legislative intent, on the other hand, raised the prospect that
judicial decision-making would be divorced from social reality and run
counter to the "political and economic forces of [the] time."'"
This same reasoning also helps explain why the realist emphasis on
empirical social science would promote support for judicial restraint. As
noted above, realists viewed empirical data as a means of ensuring the
legal system could take into account the "reality" of social relations. If
undiscoverable or irrelevant. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 871
(1930).
87. See, e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949, 967-68 (2d Cir. 1942)
(Frank, J., dissenting) ("[T]he demolition of the purposes of Congress, through stingy statutory
interpretation, is the most emphatic kind of judicial legislation. Our job is, so far as possible, to
enforce the aims of Congress."); James Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation, " 43 HARV. L.
REV. 886 (1930); cf SHAMIR, supra note 6, at 151 (arguing that one strand of realism emphasized a
move toward a socially informed law produced by Congress and the government's administrative
machinery); Cohen, supra note 16, at 810 (suggesting that to engage in realistic decision-making, a
court must address itself to such economic, sociological, political, and ethical questions as a
"competent legislature" might have faced); Llewellyn, supra note 58, at 455 ("[C]entral as are the
judges' actions in disputed cases, there is a vast body of other officials whose actions are of no less
importance; quantitatively their actions are of vastly greater importance, though it may well be that the
judge's position gives him a leverage of peculiar power.").
88. Landis, supra note 87, at 888 ("The tenure of the legislator, his parochial interests, his
opportunities for extended investigation and debate, his unlimited powers of choice between
competing devices, the numbers that he must convince, and the ephemerality of his conclusions, all
make for emphasizing the importance of his intent.").
89. Id.
90. Id. at 889; Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d at 969 ("The Legislature has the power to decide
what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should
be recognized and obeyed.").
91. Landis, supra note 87, at 892.
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empirical data was supposed to help courts ascertain the utility and
relevance of a legal rule, then deference to the branch of government best
equipped to collect and make sense of that data seemed an appropriate
posture for the judiciary.9 2 Legislative findings could help provide the
courts a window into social reality that might otherwise be obscured.
The realist call for judicial deference to administrative agencies
similarly stemmed from a belief that these agencies' expertise and greater
familiarity with social conditions made them better adjudicators of the
proper scope of regulations than the courts. Karl Llewellyn, for example,
noted that "[t]he actions of [administrative] officials touch the interested
layman more often than do those of the judge," which counseled in favor
of treating administrative action as the final expression of the law in
disputed cases. 93 Similarly, in an article arguing against judicial review of
administrative findings of fact, James Landis stressed that "the
administrative, whose daily concern is the consideration of [practical]
matters, is recognized to possess greater competence in appreciating the
bearing and weight of testimony upon that issue than would characterize
either a judge or a jury." '94 For Landis, "one [could] ask little more than to
have issues decided by those best equipped for the task."95 By declining
judicial review over administrative determinations, courts would not only
avoid unnecessary delay, but would also provide a bulwark against
"judicial legislation" rooted in "political dogma or... righteous
abstractions. '"96
II. LEGAL REALISM AND THE NEW DEAL: MORE THAN A COINCIDENCE OF
IDEAS
The series of far-reaching domestic relief measures and economic
recovery legislation enacted under President Roosevelt in the 1930s
marked a transformative period in twentieth-century American history.
Known as the New Deal, the laws passed during this period were directed
toward addressing an economic crisis of historic proportions: staggering
levels of unemployment, dismally low levels of industrial production,
skyrocketing poverty, and a nationwide loss of confidence in the U.S.
economy. Coming to power in 1933 with a mandate to take dramatic
92. Cf Cohen, supra note 16, at 810 (suggesting that to engage in realistic decision-making, a
court must address itself to such economic, sociological, political, and ethical questions as a
"competent legislature" might have faced).
93. Llewellyn, supra note 58, at 455.
94. James Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts, 47 YALE L.J. 519, 531 (1938).
95. Landis, supra note 94, at 536; see also James M. Landis, The Place ofAdministrative Law, 13
CONN. B.J. 71, 75 (1939) ("Among the reasons for utilizing the administrative method of attack was
the obvious need for expertness. The newness and the complexity of the problems that were presented
led to a general recognition that it would be unwise to entrust them to judges already busied with the
handling of a great variety of claims.").
96. Landis, supra note 94, at 536.
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action, President Roosevelt would ultimately oversee an unprecedented
expansion of federal power over the national economy. 97
In the first hundred days of his administration, Roosevelt led the
creation of important new federal agencies and programs, including the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and the Civilian Conservation Corps. He also signed into law
a raft of critical relief measures, including the Emergency Banking Act
and the Federal Emergency Relief Act.98 Later in his first term, Roosevelt
signed into law the Act creating the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Social Security Act, and the country's seminal labor law statute, the
National Labor Relations Act, which created the National Labor Relations
Board. This and related New Deal legislation granted the government
sweeping authority to implement price supports for key commodities,
finance large-scale infrastructure projects to increase employment and
output, manage labor relations and collective bargaining, and regulate
banks and financial markets. 99 Federal regulatory authority, once
relatively limited, had entered a new stage. As Roosevelt explained in his
first State of the Union address in January 1934, ten months after the
launch of the New Deal: "We have undertaken new methods. It is our task
to perfect, to improve, to alter when necessary, but in all cases to go
forward."' 0 To consolidate gains and ensure a sustainable recovery,
Roosevelt argued, New Deal legislation must focus on "mak[ing] our
economic and social structure capable of dealing with modern life."' 0 The
depths of the economic depression left no room for traditional solutions.
Bold new policy innovations, quickly and decisively implemented, were
the order of the day.
It would be difficult to imagine a jurisprudential movement more
conducive to the New Deal than legal realism. The four characteristic
features of realism discussed in Part I-a distrust of traditional legal rules,
a functional approach to law, a commitment to empiricism, and deference
to governmental bodies with "expertise" on social questions-fit well with
97. President Roosevelt himself acknowledged during his first inaugural address the coming
expansion of federal, in particular executive, authority:
It is to be hoped that the normal balance of executive and legislative authority may be wholly
adequate to meet the unprecedented task before us. But it may be that an unprecedented
demand and need for undelayed action may call for temporary departure from that normal
balance of public procedure.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT I1, 15 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).
98. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 20-21 (2003) ("In the three months
after Roosevelt's inauguration, Congress and the country were subjected to a presidential barrage of
ideas and programs unlike anything known to American history.").
99. Id.
100. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 3, 1934), in 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS
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the New Deal's emphasis on pragmatism, policy, and experimentation. °2
Whereas classical legal thought was distinctly apolitical, emphasizing a
closed system of transcendental legal rules that supposedly defined the
law, realism treated policy concerns and social consequences as
fundamental to legal inquiry. And unlike sociological jurisprudence,
realism believed that there were no sacrosanct "traditional values" that
should be shielded from questioning. These features of realism were
consonant with the spirit of the New Deal.0 3 Both realism and the New
Deal sought to demythologize inherited principles as a way to achieve
solutions better aligned with practical realities. Both saw law as a form of
socially informed expertise and as a tool for shaping social policy." In
this way, there was a natural symbiosis between realism as an intellectual
movement and the New Deal as governing philosophy.
The overlap between legal realism and the New Deal probably reflected
more basic instrumental motives as well. The New Deal provided an
opportunity for academics to land prestigious government positions, while
the Administration was able to take advantage of a substantial influx of
legal talent.1°' Prominent realists such as William Douglas, Thurman
Arnold, Jerome Frank, James Landis, Felix Cohen, and Herman Oliphant,
all assumed key governmental positions from which they helped design
and implement New Deal policies.0 6 Realist scholars who may not have
taken leave of their academic posts nonetheless "provided public defense
and justification for many of the administration's key laws, helped in
drafting laws and suggesting new forms and types of legislation, wrote
briefs, and helped to defend the administration in court."° 7 Realists had a
"hunger to make the law do something," and the New Deal provided a
prime opportunity to demonstrate the utility of law as a tool for shaping
social policy. '0
102. GLENNON, supra note 3, at 84; Louis Jaffe, Mr. Justice Jackson, 68 HARV. L. REV. 940, 942
("A constitutional technique sympathetic to the pressing interest of the moment [i.e., realism] was in
tune with the prevailing mode of liberalism which had come to power in the New Deal."); White,
supra note 10, at 999, 1025.
103. See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 100, at 8 ("Now that we are definitely in the process of
recovery, lines have been rightly drawn between those to whom this recovery means a return to old
methods ... and those for whom recovery means a reform of many old methods, a permanent
readjustment of many of our ways of thinking and therefore many of our social and economic
arrangements.").
104. See, e.g., SHAMIR, supra note 6, at 151 ("The professor-realist 'revolution' . . . moved
toward a socially informed law that was to be produced by Congress and the government's
administrative machinery under the guidance of trained experts in the art of statutory legislation and
administrative methods.").
105. Id. at 135, 156 ("The realist program was strongly tied to the agenda of the interventionist
state and to the legislative plans of a reform-oriented administration; it legitimated the administration's
experiments and in the process allowed the realists to assume positions of power and influence.").
106. HULL, supra note 3, at 260-61; KALMAN, supra note 3, at 130; SHAMIR, supra note 6, at 152
n.99.
107. SHAMIR, supra note 6, at 152.
108. Karl Llewellyn, On What is Wrong With So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
651, 662 (1935); see also KALMAN, supra note 3, at 130 (noting that, with the coming of the New
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There is little doubt that there was a degree of ideational overlap
between legal realism and the New Deal. But the intersection was more
than a mere coincidence of ideas, or a way for realist academics to land
prestigious government positions. Instead, the contention here is that the
New Deal was critical to defining realist jurisprudence. Critics that
minimize or dismiss altogether the substantive interrelationship between
legal realism and the New Deal hold too narrow a view of realist
jurisprudence.1 °9 Realism in practice may not always have matched its
theoretical exposition, but that in itself did not mean that realism was
abandoned or had nothing to contribute once its leading expositors joined
the New Deal. The New Deal should be viewed as where the practice of
realism met the theory of realism. The result was the refinement of
realism's definitional contours and a better understanding of the
implications of realism for critical questions of constitutional law,
something rarely addressed in the key realist writings. Realist
jurisprudence was, in fact, New Deal jurisprudence-the latter marked the
"operationalization" of the former.
A. The New Deal as a Constitutive Element of Realist Jurisprudence
To illustrate the importance of the New Deal for defining realist
jurisprudence, this section draws upon key primary sources and
biographical accounts: a speech and an article by Jerome Frank and
Thurman Arnold, respectively, two realist expositors turned practitioners;
an important law review article by Karl Llewellyn that outlines a realist
theory of constitutional law; separate criticisms of legal realism's role in
the New Deal by Roscoe Pound and Walter Kennedy; and biographical
accounts of key realist policymakers that demonstrate how the New Deal
facilitated the "operationalization" of realist jurisprudence.
Jerome Frank's December 1933 speech before the Association of
American Law Schools offers one of the most compelling explications of
the legal realist-New Deal nexus. Frank, a key realist figure who was then
serving as General Counsel of the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration, told his audience that "realistic jurisprudence" should be
renamed "experimental jurisprudence" because realism's foremost
commitment was to "find new principles [and] new guides for action"
where old principles had proven inadequate.' ° For Frank, the realist
commitment to challenging established ways of thinking was also the
essence of the New Deal:
We are to be primarily interested in seeking the welfare of the
great majority of our people and not in merely preserving,
Deal, faculty and students at Yale Law School now had a chance "to put realism to work").
109. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
110. Jerome Frank, Realism in Jurisprudence, 7 AM. L. SCH. REV. 1063, 1064 (1933).
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unmodified, certain traditions and folkways, regardless of their
effect on human beings. That important shift in emphasis is the
vital difference between the "new deal" and the "old deal"
philosophy. "'
Frank emphasized that the ideal "experimentalist" government lawyer
focused first on the "desirability or urgency of the proposed [government]
project" when analyzing whether such a project would be permissible
under existing law. 12 If the program would produce desirable social
results, and the relevant statute was ambiguous, the experimentalist
lawyer's first inclination and priority was to "work out an argument, if
possible, so to construe the statute as to validate [the] program.""13
Existing legal principles should not be given controlling weight-social
utility, rather than legal precedent, was the touchstone.
For Frank, realism's functional orientation found natural expression in
the New Deal. Whereas realists as scholars emphasized the idea that
changes in society justified changes in the law, realists as practitioners
actually implemented these changes and helped create the new
government bodies that would enforce these new laws:
In many ways those who sympathize... with experimental
jurisprudence [i.e. realism] have found it easy to work for the "new
deal." It is not only because they are less procrustean and more
flexible in their techniques. It is because legal institutions and
devices are constantly viewed by them as human contrivances to
be judged by their every-day human consequences. They [adopt] a
kind of thinking which makes it easy to test legal postulates by
their results in human lives. Accordingly, the experimentalists are
stimulated by the opportunity to contrive new governmental
agencies to be used experimentally as means for achieving better
results[.] 114
Frank's vision is a far cry from those who contend that realism lost its way
once the New Deal gained momentum. The picture Frank paints is one in
which the success of the New Deal largely depended on the application of
realist jurisprudence. Of course, Frank, a progenitor of realist thought, had
every incentive to emphasize the importance of realism for the New Deal.
But to concede that Frank may have been engaging in a bit of self-
congratulatory rhetoric does not change the fact that realists saw in the
New Deal a chance to apply realist theory. Frank's speech illustrates that
realists did indeed "take their ideas with them" to Washington." 5 The
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 1065-66.
113. Id. at 1065.
114. Id. at 1066.
115. Neil Duxbury argues that "while legal realists ... may have flocked to Washington to work
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New Deal, then, was very much part of the realist story.
Thurman Arnold's November 1933 article in The New Republic titled
The New Deal is Constitutional provides another example of the close,
substantive interrelationship between legal realism and the New Deal. 1
6
Arnold, who would eventually head the Justice Department's Antitrust
Division, was a professor at the Yale Law School at the time he wrote the
article, while also working for the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration." 7 In the article, Arnold argued that New Deal lawyers
were wrong to think that "huge fissures in constitutional logic" were
required for the Supreme Court to uphold New Deal legislation, or that
"[t]he language of economics and sociology" was needed to "fill in the
gaps in the logical structure."' 18 Instead, all that was needed was an
appropriately expansive reading of Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce, a power that included business transactions and trade affected
with a public interest:
No actual dilemma between logic and expediency faces the
Supreme Court if it supports the government. The fact is that the
logic of the cases is in favor of the recent legislation, that new
doctrine and new terminology are necessary only if the acts are
held unconstitutional, and that resort to economics and sociology is
required only of those who oppose the legislation." 9
At first glance, Arnold's dismissal of the need to appeal to economics
and sociology might be read to suggest that he did not view a realist
approach as relevant to constitutional litigation of New Deal legislation.
But realism was in fact central to the article's main thesis. Arnold was
arguing for an interpretation of the "business affected with a public
interest" doctrine that would take into account current economic
conditions when assessing the constitutionally permissible boundaries of
the government's commerce power. It was an interpretation, Arnold noted,
that the Court had already shown a willingness to adopt.'2° For Arnold,
that such an interpretation might stretch the previously recognized limits
of the Commerce Clause did not make that interpretation
unconstitutional-it was simply the natural result of adjusting existing
legal principles to new facts:
If the business is affected with a public interest, [then] price,
production and employment may be regulated. We have only to
determine, therefore, whether the present emergency has affected
general business transactions and trade in agricultural commodities
116. Thurman Arnold, The New Deal is Constitutional, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 15, 1933,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/93783/new-deal-constitutional.
117. KALMAN, supra note 3, at 130.
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with a public interest. If it has, our logical inquiry has ended. 12'
Arnold thus applied realism's functional approach to the Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence to show that there was no need to "invent
new doctrine" to uphold the New Deal. 122 He also recognized that this
approach was likely to produce an unprecedented expansion of the
government's regulatory power. The key for Arnold, however, was that
the legal doctrine, and the "constitutional logic" that underpinned it, did
not contain, and could not be read to contain, a fixed rule for what the
government could and could not regulate. 123 The "rule" ultimately relied
for definition on the social conditions it was designed to manage. Arnold's
argument, then, reflected the "rule skepticism" and preference for flexible
legal categories that were a core characteristic of realist thought. Changes
in social policy meant changes both in the scope of the controlling legal
category, as well as in the substance of the legal rule or precedent: '24
It is probably true that never before in the history of the country
have so many things become affected with a public interest (and
therefore subject to regulation) at the same time. The government
appears to have undergone a change. Persons who feel that
constitutional logic always opposes change therefore talk about
[New Deal legislation] as unconstitutional. But the doctrine that
too many things may not be affected by a public interest at the
same time has never been announced in any judicial
decision.... It is therefore those who oppose the constitutionality
of the act who must stretch the logic of constitutional law to the
breaking point-not those who favor it.
Here, then, was realism applied to the constitutional problems of the
day. While most of the seminal realist writings focused on private law,
Arnold's article outlined how realist insights could apply in the public law
context. Realism meant that "constitutional logic" needed to take into
account that "conditions ha[d] changed."'' 25 The New Deal was
constitutional not because of any new legal formulae, but because changed
social conditions meant that doctrine now yielded different results. This
was an important argument, and one that, like Frank's AALS speech on
experimental jurisprudence, suggests how realism achieved fuller
expression through the New Deal. Far from supplanting realism, or
consigning it to irrelevance, the New Deal provided a means of more fully
defining realist thought in the constitutional context.
The sentiment expressed in Arnold's New Republic article was followed
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important article in the Columbia Law Review titled The Constitution as
an Institution, Llewellyn argued that a "sane theory of constitutional law"
should be rooted in the actual practices and functioning of government
rather than the text or original intent of the Constitution.126 For Llewellyn,
the Constitution was, in the first instance, an "institution"-a set of ways
of living and doing-rather than a matter of words or rules. 27 In this view,
only "practice" could legitimize the words "as being still part of the going
Constitution"; the words could not legitimize the practice. 28 This meant
that neither a formal ratification process nor altering the language of the
document was needed to amend the Constitution. Instead, "the working
Constitution [was] amended whenever the basic ways of government
[were] changed."' 29 Llewellyn's theory, then, was ultimately functional-
"a theory built ... in terms of scope for change." 30
A constitutional theory built in terms of "scope for change" meant that
the Constitution itself had to be treated as inherently flexible. A rigid
adherence to text, original intent, or past decisions simply did not provide
workable guidance for addressing the difficult judicial problems that lie in
what Llewellyn called "the penumbra of the working Constitution."'' 31
This was the region where there existed little or conflicting precedent, or
where contemporary issues of modem economic life clashed against the
original intent of the founding Constitution. For Llewellyn, the key to
ensuring that the Constitution remained a viable framework for solving
modern problems was to allow for "leeway and give" in constitutional
analysis.'32 "No institutional structure can be viable," Llewellyn noted,
"save insofar as it contains within itself the wherewithal for give, for
readjustment, for self-sanation [sic]."' 33 In this view, the appropriate way
to frame the judicial inquiry into the validity of a challenged statute or
piece of legislation was to ask: "Is this within the leeway of change which
our going governmental scheme affords? And even if not, does the nature
of the case require the leeway to be widened to include it?"' 34 Llewellyn
believed that framing the inquiry this way would ensure that constitutional
analysis was rooted "not in an ancient Text, but in a living
Government."' 35
Llewellyn's theory of constitutional law not only embodied the flexible
and experimental approach characteristic of the New Deal; it was also, in
126. Llewellyn, supra note 29, at 1.
127. Id. at 17.
128. Id. at 12, 17.
129. Id. at 22.
130. Id. at 32.
131. Id. at 30.
132. Id. at 31-33.
133. Id. at 31.
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fact, partly defined in specific reference to the New Deal. In providing
examples for his assertion that "the working Constitution is amended
whenever the basic ways of government are changed," Llewellyn pointed
to President Roosevelt's establishment of the National Recovery
Administration as an instance calling for such "amendment." 136
Furthermore, after touching on the recent expansion of federal regulatory
power in various places throughout the article, Llewellyn characterized the
"lines of distribution [of power] between federal and local authorities" as
"inane" and concluded that "[t]he federal government should be doing
much that the states do now."' 37 Llewellyn's theory, then, seems to have
been formed with the New Deal as a point of departure. The government's
economic recovery legislation and expanding regulatory power were
inviting the realists to consider the implications of realism in new areas.
Roscoe Pound and Walter Kennedy's separate criticisms of realism's
relationship to the New Deal provides another example of the centrality of
the New Deal in realist jurisprudence. There are many examples from
which to draw, but examination of a few will suffice.
As the New Deal became increasingly embedded in the nation's social
and economic fabric, Pound's opposition to the administrative agencies
created to adjudicate the legality of New Deal policies grew apace.138
There was some irony in this opposition as Pound had previously spoken
enthusiastically of the rise of the administrative state and the advantages
of "administrative justice."'' 3' But as the power of these agencies grew,
and the role of "traditional" courts retrenched, Pound sought to sound the
alarm of an emergent "administrative absolutism."' 40 In a 1938 report of
the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Administrative
Law, Pound explained the nature of the problem this way:
[Since the advent of the New Deal,] administrative bureaus and
agencies are constantly pressing upon legislatures for increased
jurisdiction and for exemption from review, and in the nature of
the case encroach continually on the domain of judicial
justice.... In consequence, except as the bar takes upon itself to
act, there is nothing to check the tendency of administrative
bureaus to extend the scope of their operations indefinitely even to
the extent of supplanting our traditional judicial regime by an
administrative regime. 4'
"The ideal of administrative absolutism," warned Pound, "[was] a highly
136. Id. at 22.
137. Id. at 38.
138. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 217-22; HULL, supra note 3, at 257-6 1; DUXBURY, supra note 4,
at 153.
139. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 218.
140. Roscoe Pound et al., Special Comm. on Admin. Law, Report of the Special Committee of
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centralized administration set up under complete control of the
executive..., relieved of judicial review and making its own rules."' 142
Administrative justice, which Pound once characterized as a superior form
ofjustice, was now no justice at all.143
Pound blamed realist jurisprudence for fueling the rise of the
administrative state and the erosion of a "traditional court-centered rule of
law ideal." 144 In one passage of the Report, he referred to Felix Cohen's
seminal legal realist article Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, and commented that "[t]hose who would turn the
administration of justice over to administrative absolutism regard
[authoritative legal principles] as illusory. They expect law in this sense to
disappear." 145 In other parts of the Report, he chided Jerome Frank's
views on experimental jurisprudence and the New Deal as too deferential
to administrative agencies and tantamount to complicity in the
politicization of the law. 146 And if there was any doubt about where he
stood on the question of realism's role in the New Deal's embrace of
administrative law, Pound later made clear his view that "realist
doctrine... may be seen in action in administrative absolutism."' 147
Pound, then, was convinced that realism had found operational expression
in the New Deal's administrative regime.
Walter Kennedy's impassioned critiques of realism offer additional
insight into the New Deal's constituent role in defining realist
jurisprudence. His 1934 article The New Deal in the Law is but one
example. 48 In the article, Kennedy characterized realism as the "legal
New Deal" or the "New Deal in the law," and suggested that it would be a
critical factor in deciding "the real juristic battles loom[ing] on the
horizon" over the constitutionality of New Deal legislation. 149 In
Kennedy's view, realism's insistence that "the main objective of the law is
to "get things done," to consider the "desirable effects" and to be not too
exacting about the law under which it is accomplished,"' 50 meant the
demise of "juristic anchors" such as precedent and traditional legal
principles, with ominous implications for basic conceptions of the rule of
law. 5' In one passage that captured the basic sentiment, Kennedy
142. Id. at 343.
143. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 218-20.
144. Id. at 220.
145. Pound et al., supra note 140, at 340.
146. Id. at 336, 350.
147. ROSCOE POUND, CONTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY 20 (1940).
148. Walter Kennedy, The New Deal in the Law, 68 U.S. L. REV. 533 (1934); Walter Kennedy,
More Functional Nonsense-A Reply to Felix S. Cohen, 6 FORDHAM L. REV. 75 (1937); Walter
Kennedy, Realism, What Next, 7 FORDHAM L. REV. 203 (1938); Walter Kennedy, A Review of Legal
Realism, 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 362 (1940).
149. Kennedy, The New Deal in the Law, supra note 148, at 533.
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summarized the point this way:
[The New Deal in the law] prides itself on action and law in action.
But there are shortcomings to this generous "functional approach"
which these well meaning and estimable gentleman [i.e., the
realists] seem to miss .... [T]here is an approaching crisis in the
law as a result of the so-called scientific, fact-finding, functional,
psychological, and experimental theories of law and law-making--
theories which contain everything except law as formerly defined,
practiced and taught. 152
For Kennedy then, the New Deal was breathing life into an upstart,
potentially dangerous, jurisprudential movement that threatened to
destabilize the very foundations of the legal order.
The government careers of realists-turned-practitioners also help
illuminate the New Deal's role in defining the realist movement. In his
excellent essay arguing for the importance of biography in understanding
realist jurisprudence, Roy Kreitner presses the point that "in the context of
the debate over the meaning of realism, career choices bear theoretical
importance." '53 Kreitner bases this proposition on an "institutional"
perspective of law that holds that, as an institution, "law cannot be
captured without accounting for the people who populate it, those people
who carry out its work, the personnel." '154 For Kreitner, the New Deal
careers of prominent realists helped to "fill in a number of suggestive gaps
in a realist conception of law, highlighting the importance of law as a
going institution, and one that should be understood through the complex
of "law-and-government" jobs." '55 To know what realism was, we have to
understand what the realists did.
Kreitner's case is convincing. By way of a review of Dalia Tsuk
Mitchell's intellectual biography of Felix Cohen, Kreitner argues that
Cohen's work at the Department of Interior during the New Deal enriched
Cohen's understanding of realism's relationship to law in practice.' 5 6 As
one example, Kreitner points to Cohen's drafting of the Indian Claims
Commission Act. One of the challenges Cohen faced while drafting the
Act was how to protect aboriginal conceptions of property in Alaska when
those conceptions did not fall within the rigid categories of property
recognized by the legal system. Cohen, Kreitner argues, responded in a
quintessentially realist fashion: since an existing legal category was
obstructing a socially desirable result, Cohen sought to either modify the
category or apply, perhaps unconventionally, a different category. '57 In the
152. Id. at 538.
153. Roy Kreitner, Biographing Realist Jurisprudence, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 765, 769 (2010).
154. Id. at 769.
155. Id.
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end, Cohen's answer was to recast what were essentially Indian property
claims in contractual terms.158 This reconceptualization gave the
commission authority over a category of claims that otherwise would not
have been recognized. "The legal strategy Cohen employed in pushing an
expansive mandate for the claims commission," explained Kreitner, "was
based in text-book realism, shifting almost seamlessly between legal
categories."' 5 9 In this way, Cohen's service in the New Deal helped to
ground realist jurisprudence in social reality.
Kreitner's brief assessment of Thurman Arnold's New Deal service also
illustrates the convergence of "practical experience and theoretical
predilections" that occurred when realists entered government service. 6°
Centering his analysis on a review of Spencer Weber's biography of
Arnold, Kreitner argues that contrary to the critique of some prominent
intellectual historians, there was not "an irresolvable tension between
Arnold's [realist writings] and his work as a New Dealer."' 161 It is true that
Arnold as scholar and theorist had decried the antitrust laws as empty
symbols, while as head of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division he
vigorously enforced them, but Kreitner suggest this stemmed from
Arnold's pragmatism and functional approach, rather than from an
abandonment of realist thinking. Once Arnold was expected to enforce the
antitrust laws, he did so not out of devotion to a feckless symbolism, but
rather with an eye towards practical results:
Arnold was willing to do whatever he thought could work in order
to increase production, improve distribution, and benefit the
ultimate consumer. In doing so, he was pursuing the realist spirit in
its most direct form: it was simultaneously a critique of the empty
formalism of principle, an attempt to reorganize institutions on the
basis of function and results, and a willingness to embrace
experimentalism in pursuing those results. 162
Thus Arnold's service on behalf of the New Deal, like Cohen's,
illustrates how the New Deal helped define realism. As government
practitioners, realists were able to reconcile theory with practice, thereby
elevating the importance of non-judicial institutions in the realist
conception of law. For a jurisprudence theoretically rooted in a "functional
approach" to law, the New Deal helped substantiate this foundational
realist principle by giving realists direct experience with those
institutions---executive departments, administrative agencies, the
Congress-most central to the everyday functioning of law.
This Part has made the case that the New Deal was central to legal
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 779.
161. Id. at 776.
162. Id. at 775.
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realism and should be used to define it. The literature that minimizes the
relationship between the two, or treats the ascendance of the New Deal as
marking the beginning of the end of realism, fails to appreciate that the
New Deal was the platform that took realism from theory to practice. The
New Deal allowed realist jurisprudence to expand into areas that its
expositors had yet to examine in depth in their writings-constitutional
litigation, administrative law, and policymaking. As Shamir notes in
arguing for the status-enhancing effect of the New Deal on realist
academics: "It was [the] forceful combination of their academic standing
and their political influence during the New Deal that enabled the realists
to reframe the spatial boundaries of law."'63 Absent the New Deal,
realism arguably was little more than a passing intellectual fad-a
provocative and compelling one to be sure, but one that would have
remained a degree removed from the actual formulation and
implementation, as opposed to the adjudication, of law. Through the New
Deal, however, realism was able to inject itself into the workings of
government in a way that expanded the definitional bounds of realist
jurisprudence.
III. WICKARD V. FILBURN: A REALIST REVOLUTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
The first two parts of the paper examined the core characteristics of
legal realism and analyzed the relationship between legal realism and the
New Deal. This Part situates the landmark 1942 case of Wickard v.
Filburn in a realist context and argues that the Court applied a legal realist
framework in deciding the case. As will be shown, Justice Robert
Jackson's opinion in the case provides a compelling illustration of realist
principles in action.
A. Prologue to Wickard: Of Commerce and Categories
Before turning to Wickard, it will be useful to assess the contours of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence pre-Wickard. This review reveals the
largely formalist nature of the Court's pre-Wickard Commerce Clause
jurisprudence-one dominated by artificial distinctions and arbitrary legal
categories. In short, the Court had constructed a framework of rigid,
technical legal concepts to guide its Commerce Clause analysis. This
allowed it to strike down New Deal legislation that was based on an
expansive view of federal regulatory power commensurate with the
breadth and depth of the economic crisis to which the legislation was
directed. Indeed, the clash between the Court's conceptualist approach to
resolving questions of the federal commerce power and the New Deal's
163. SHAMIR, supra note 6, at 135.
2015]
27
Curtis: Realism Revisited: Reaffirming the Centrality of the New Deal in
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
basic premise that the government must be able to "permanently
readjust"' ' 4 the previously accepted bounds of federal regulatory power
was a paradigmatic example of the realist conception of "society in flux,
and in flux typically faster than the law."' 65 Understanding the Court's
formalistic pre-Wickard approach to Commerce Clause controversies
helps illustrate why this line of jurisprudence was a good target for realist
thinking, and how the Wickard opinion in particular amounted to a realist
turn.
Two opinions in particular provide a compelling illustration of the
Court's hostility to the New Deal, and its use of a conceptual approach to
invalidate key New Deal legislation. These decisions are A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corporation v. United States'66 and Carter v. Carter Coal. 167 Both
of these decisions highlight the rigid legal categories the Court had
developed in previous years as a framework for analyzing the scope of the
federal commerce power.
At issue in Schechter was a regulation called the "Live Poultry
Code."'168 The Code had been promulgated under the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA), a key component of the New Deal, and included
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions. Principals of the Schechter
Poultry Corporation, which operated a Brooklyn slaughterhouse, were
convicted of violating these minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions.
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions. In a unanimous opinion
written by Chief Justice Charles Hughes, the Court first held that section 3
of the NIRA, which granted the President the power to authorize new and
controlling prohibitions through codes of law, was an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.' 69 This meant that the Live Poultry Code,
including its minimum wage and maximum hour provisions, was void.
The Court further held that even if the Code was a valid regulation, it
could not be applied to the defendants because the defendants were not
engaged in interstate commerce. 170
To demonstrate that the Schechter Corporation was not engaged in
interstate commerce, the Court began by emphasizing that the
corporation's activities, as opposed to the activities of those who
facilitated the business of the defendants, were not transactions in
interstate commerce. '7' The poultry in question may have been transported
164. See, e.g., Roosevelt supra note 103 (quoting Roosevelt's 1934 Annual Message to
Congress).
165. Llewellyn, supra note 1I, at 1236.
166. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
167. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
168, Schechter, 295 U.S. at 521-31.
169. Id. at 535-42.
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from out of state, but once the poultry reached the defendant's
slaughterhouses, the interstate aspect of the transaction ended. The Court
acknowledged that the Code might have been a valid regulation if applied
to the transportation of the poultry or the transactions underlying the
transfer and eventual sale of the poultry to the slaughterhouses, but it
could not be applied to a slaughterhouse operator's wage and hour policy.
The activities of the slaughterhouse-slaughtering the poultry and selling
it within the state-were local in nature. As Chief Justice Hughes noted:
When defendants had made their purchases.., the poultry was
trucked to their slaughterhouses in Brooklyn for local disposition.
The interstate transactions in relation to that poultry then ended.
Defendants held the poultry at their slaughterhouse markets for
slaughter and local sale to retail dealers and butchers who in turn
sold directly to consumers. Neither the slaughtering nor the sales
by defendants were transactions in interstate commerce. 172
The Court's division of slaughterhouse commerce into interstate and
local transactions was critical because it allowed the Court to demonstrate
the absence of a continuous "current" or "stream of interstate commerce."
The "stream of commerce" concept was one the Court had established in
previous cases-most notably Swift & Company v. United States and
Stafford v. Wallace-to permit government regulation of transactions that
were not interstate when considered in isolation, but were nonetheless
essential to facilitating the "flow" of interstate commerce. 73 It was meant
to be a flexible notion, recognizing the difficulty of sorting business
operations into neat categories. In Schechter, however, the Court treated it
in formalistic terms. The "stream of commerce" theory could not save the
Code, the Court stated, because the slaughtering and sale of the poultry at
issue was not a necessary part of maintaining a broader flow of interstate
commerce. In fact, the poultry "had come to permanent rest within the
state"--the flow of interstate commerce had ceased. '74
After holding that neither the goods nor the activities at issue in
Schechter fell within a stream of interstate commerce, the Court then
addressed the extent to which the defendant's transactions might have
been said to "affect" interstate commerce. The Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence recognized that the federal government could regulate local
transactions, if such transactions had a close relationship to interstate
commerce.' 75 In assessing the relationship between local and interstate
transactions, the Court noted that it followed a "necessary and well-
172. Id.
173. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375
(1905).
174. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 543.
175. Id. at 544.
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established distinction between direct and indirect effects."' 176 If the way in
which the defendant set hours and wages at its slaughterhouses directly
affected interstate commerce-that is, if Schechter's intrastate activities
undermined interstate commerce in live poultry-then Congress might
have the power to regulate hours and wages. "But where the effect of
intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce is merely indirect, such
transactions remain within the domain of state power." 177
Applying the direct-indirect distinction, the Court found that the hours
and wages of the slaughterhouse employees had no direct relation to
interstate commerce. The government argued that the direct effect
stemmed from the fact that a slaughterhouse operator paying lower wages
and requiring longer hours could lower the sale price for its product
thereby depressing prices industry wide.' 78 The Court found this argument
wholly unconvincing, and emphasized that if the government was
permitted to regulate the manner in which a local business could control
costs and prices, then the commerce power could be extended to almost all
manner of local business policies, including "number of employees, rents,
advertising, methods of doing business, etc."' 179 "[T]he authority of the
federal government," wrote Chief Justice Hughes, "may not be pushed to
such an extreme as to destroy the distinction" between interstate
commerce and local activities. '80
The formalism of Chief Justice Hughes's opinion in Schechter was not
lost on contemporary observers.' 8 ' Writing shortly after the opinion,
Edward Corwin viewed the decision as rooted in a dogmatic
"conceptualism" and saw within its reasoning a "determination to resist
the inrush of fact with the besom of formula."' 82 The legal distinctions
invoked in the decision were "artificial in the highest degree" and contrary
to a "realistic mode of reasoning" that would have recognized the
consequences of the Schechter Corporation's wage and hour policies-
namely, diversion of the stream of interstate commerce in poultry toward
themselves.' 83 By approaching the case in categorical rather than
consequentialist terms, the Court unduly constrained the federal
government's ability to respond to a dire economic situation that called for
innovative legal approaches. 4
176. Id. at 546.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 548-49.
179. 1d. at 549.
180. Id. at 550.
181. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 158-59 (1998).
182. Id. at 158 (quoting E. S. Corwin, The Schechter Case-Landmark, or What, 13 N.Y.U. L. Q.
REV. 151,170 (1936)).
183. Corwin, supra note 182, at 186, 189.
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In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the Court again analyzed the scope of the
federal commerce power through a formalist lens. Among the questions
presented in Carter was whether the labor provisions of the Bituminous
Coal Conservation Act of 1935 could be upheld as an exercise of the
federal power to regulate interstate commerce.1 15 The labor provisions
included protection of the right of mine workers to organize and bargain
collectively, the regulation of minimum wages and maximum hours of
labor for mine employees, and the creation of a labor board to adjudicate
disputes.186 In the preamble to the Act, Congress declared that the
production and distribution of bituminous coal "[bore] upon and directly
affect[ed] interstate commerce" and that the labor provisions were
necessary "to avoid obstructions in interstate commerce that recur in
industrial disputes over labor relations at the mines."187
In finding that the labor provisions of the Act were not a valid exercise
of the federal commerce power, the Court applied its previously-
established categories. First, the Court emphasized the distinction between
manufacturing and production, on the one hand, and commerce on the
other. Mining was a mix of manufacturing and production, and thus an
activity separate and apart from the commercial intercourse that followed
it. "Commerce succeeds to manufacture," noted the Court, "and is not a
part of it.' ' 188 Furthermore, manufacturing and production were local
activities. Referencing a hypothetical business owner, the Court
commented: "So far as he produces or manufactures a commodity, his
business is purely local. So far as he sells and ships, or contracts to sell
and ship, the commodity to customers in another state, he engages in
interstate commerce."' 89 As a result, labor issues at the mines-including
the fixing of wages, hours, and working conditions-were incidents of
local production, not of interstate trade. Summarizing the Court's analysis
on this point, Justice Sutherland put it thus:
A consideration of the foregoing ... renders inescapable the
conclusion that the effect of the labor provisions of the act,
including those in respect of minimum wages, wage agreements,
collective bargaining, and the Labor Board and its powers,
primarily falls upon production and not upon commerce; and
confirms the further resulting conclusion that production is a
purely local activity. It follows that none of these essential
antecedents of production constitutes a transaction in or forms any
part of interstate commerce. 190
The Court then turned to the current of commerce theory that had
185. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
186. Id. at 279-84.
187. Id. at 280.
188. Id. at 300.
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featured so prominently in Schechter. Again, the approach was
categorical-either the coal was in the flow of interstate commerce or it
was not. If the coal was in the flow of commerce, then Congress could
regulate labor relations at the mines under Swift and Stafford, decisions
that had authorized federal regulation of local activities that, if left
unregulated, would interfere with the flow of interstate commerce.
The Court quickly dismissed the argument that the coal at issue, or the
coal mines more broadly, were located within a current of interstate
commerce. In Swift and Stafford, noted the Court, "live stock [sic] was
consigned and delivered to stockyards[,] not as a place of final destination,
but as... a throat through which the current flows.""19 Activities and
transactions at the local stockyards in those cases could be regulated
because the livestock was still moving through the current of commerce to
other markets. In Carter, however, the coal was being produced and
manufactured at local mines-it had not yet entered the flow of
commerce. For the Court, this was the mirror image of Schechter. In that
case, "the flow had ceased," while in this case the flow "had not
begun."' 1
92
Finally, the Court analyzed whether labor relations at coal mines had a
direct or indirect effect on interstate commerce. In a move that seemed to
double down on the formalism inherent in the direct-indirect distinction,
the Court framed its analysis by noting that the determination of whether
the effect of a given activity was direct or indirect was separate from the
question of the magnitude of the effect. "[Tjhe extent of the effect,"
remarked the Court, "bears no relation to its character."' 93 And in this
case, potential labor disputes at the mines did not "operate proximately"
on interstate commerce: 19
4
Working conditions are obviously local conditions. The employees
are not engaged in or about commerce, but exclusively in
producing a commodity. And the controversies and evils, which it
is the object of the act to regulate and minimize, are local
controversies and evils affecting local work undertaken to
accomplish that local result. Such effect as they may have upon
commerce, however extensive it may be, is secondary and indirect.
An increase in the greatness of the effect adds to its importance. It
does not alter its character.' 95
This was clearly formalism par excellence. To hold that the magnitude
of an effect on interstate commerce was irrelevant to the nature of that
effect was to ignore the social consequences that could result from
191. Id. at 305.
192. Id. at 306.
193. Id. at 308.
194. Id. at 307.
195. id. at 308-09.
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contentious labor relations, particularly when viewed from an industry-
wide perspective. The Court was allowing legal categories, rather than
practical realities, to drive judicial decision-making. The result was
invalidation of another key component of the New Deal program.
Schechter and Carter Coal illustrate the conceptualism that largely
underpinned the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence prior to
Wickard. The formalist edifice began to crack, however, when the Court
decided NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation in 1937. 96 In Jones
& Laughlin, the Court began to "deformalize" the legal distinctions that
had led the Court to hold to a narrow view of interstate commerce. Jones
& Laughlin did not completely obliterate these distinctions-the Court
would not do this until Wickard-but the case clearly provided an opening
for the Court to view Commerce Clause doctrine in less categorical terms.
Conventional wisdom holds that Chief Justice Hughes's decision in
Jones & Laughlin upholding the National Labor Relations Act as a valid
exercise of the federal commerce power-a decision that was part of a
broader shift in the Court's posture toward New Deal legislation-was
primarily the result of political pressure stemming from President
Roosevelt's "Court-packing plan" announced earlier in 1937.'9 This view,
however, overlooks at least two things. First, as Barry Cushman points
out, the Court had successfully ignored multiple legislative attempts to
control judicial behavior in the years immediately preceding the Court-
packing plan. 9 8 Given recent history, the justices need not have been
overly concerned about Roosevelt's most recent proposal. Second, the
NLRB's argument in Jones & Laughlin relied on a straightforward
application of the current of commerce theory: industrial strife caused by
unfair labor practices impeded the interstate movement of raw materials
and products.' 99 Hughes could have simply adopted the theory as
presented without expanding the bounds of current doctrine. This would
have allowed the Court to uphold the NLRA and still "avoid charges of
trimming principles for political convenience."200 But Hughes went
beyond a deductive application of the current of commerce theory.
Instead, he took the opportunity to, in effect, restate the area of commerce
clause jurisprudence dealing with the distinction between local activities
and nationwide commerce. A philosophical shift then, as much as political
pressure, seemed to be at work. The result was a seminal chink in the
conservative Court's formalist armor.
The issue in Jones & Laughlin was whether the National Labor
196. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
197. For a compelling historical account of President Roosevelt's court-packing plan, see JEFF
SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT (2010).
198. CUSHMAN, SUpra note 181, at 12.
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Relations Act (NLRA)-a landmark New Deal law that regulated labor
relations by safeguarding employees' right to organize and bargain
collectively-could be upheld as a valid exercise of the commerce
power.2"' The NLRB had found that Jones & Laughlin had violated the
NLRA by engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce. After the
corporation failed to comply with the NLRB's cease and desist order, the
Board petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce the order.
The Fifth Circuit denied the petition on the grounds that the NLRB order
exceeded the federal commerce power. The Court granted certiorari.
In his opinion upholding the NLRA, Hughes seemed to acknowledge
that the main Jones & Laughlin steel plant was located in a current of
commerce, but he declined to decide the case on that basis. After noting
the reasons that Jones & Laughlin proffered to show that its plant was not
in the current of commerce, the Court contended that the argument over
whether the plant was inside or outside the flow of commerce did not
resolve the constitutional question:
We do not find it necessary to determine whether these features of
defendant's business dispose of the asserted analogy to the 'stream
of commerce' cases. The instances in which that metaphor has
been used are but particular, and not exclusive illustrations of the
protective power which the government invokes in support of the
present act. The congressional authority to protect interstate
commerce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to
transactions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a
'flow' of interstate or foreign commerce. Burdens and obstructions
may be due to injurious action springing from other sources.2 °2
This passage was an important indication of the Court's less categorical
approach to questions of the federal commerce power. It was not
necessary to locate a local activity within a stream of commerce to permit
federal regulation of that activity, suggested Hughes. It was the extent to
which the activity directly impeded interstate commerce that mattered, not
the extent to which the activity was within or without a current of
commerce.
It is a familiar principle that acts which directly burden or obstruct
interstate or foreign commerce, or its free flow, are within the
reach of the congressional power. Acts having that effect are not
rendered immune because they grow out of labor disputes. It is the
effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which is the
criterion.20 3
Hughes then identified the general principle that would save the NLRA.
"Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately
201. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
202. Id. at 36.
203. Id. at 31,32.
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considered," wrote Hughes, "if they have such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate
to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot
be denied the power to exercise that control. ' '2' The fact that the
employees were engaged in local production, rather than interstate
commerce, was not determinative. Jones & Laughlin's highly integrated,
national network of supply, transportation, manufacturing, production, and
distribution meant that their main steel plant could not be conceived of in
local terms. Hughes explained that labor conflicts at the plant, while
technically "local," could have "paralyzing consequences" for the steel
industry, an obvious direct effect on national commerce."0 5 With the Jones
& Laughlin decision, one of the staunchest defenders of categorical
thinking in Commerce Clause jurisprudence had just launched a shot
across the bow of formalism. The stage was now set for a more frontal
assault on the conceptual approach that had constrained the scope of the
federal commerce power. Wickard would provide the opening.
B. Background to Wickard v. Filburn
At the heart of the litigation in Wickard was an iconic New Deal law
called the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, passed after the Court
declared the original Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
unconstitutional. 2 6 The Act's main purpose was to achieve a "balanced
flow" of agricultural commodities in interstate and foreign commerce to
restore the market value of such commodities, which had been severely
undercut by the depression and an ongoing overproduction of crops. 207
The Act sought to accomplish this goal by mandating subsidies for key
crops, such as cotton, corn, and wheat; by establishing acreage allotments
as a control on how much of these crops farmers could harvest; and by
imposing marketing quotas that limited the amount of crops farmers could
sell °.2 8 The Act and its amendments also included financial penalties to be
assessed against farms that exceeded production quotas.20 9
The facts of the Wickard case are fairly straightforward.210 A small
farmer in Ohio named Roscoe Filbum violated his acreage allotment under
the 1938 Act, cultivating twice as many acres of wheat as allowed and
harvesting a couple hundred excess bushels. In accordance with the
penalties contained in a then recently passed amendment to the Act,
204. Id. at 37.
205. Id. at41.
206. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating the Agricultural Adjustment Act).
207. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31, 31 (1938).
208. /d.
209. Id. at 52-55.
210. See generally Jim Chen, The Story of Wickard v. Filburn: Agriculture, Aggregation, and
Commerce, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2009); Jim Chen, Filburn's
Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719 (2003).
2015]
35
Curtis: Realism Revisited: Reaffirming the Centrality of the New Deal in
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
county officials in Ohio assessed the prescribed monetary penalty on
Filburn's excess bushels and imposed a lien on his wheat crop. Filburn
filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
challenging his marketing excess penalty. The District Court ruled in favor
of Filburn and enjoined enforcement of the Act. 21' The majority opinion
emphasized that farmers had not been given sufficient notice of the
increased penalties and concluded that the amendment "retroactively"
effected "a taking of ... property without due process. 2 2
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the parties had
refocused the dispute squarely on the question of whether the Act's
regulation of wheat harvested for home consumption was a valid exercise
of the government's commerce power.213 Filburn argued that his excess
wheat could not be regulated as an exercise of the government's
commerce power because the wheat was consumed on his farm rather than
sold in the marketplace. This kind of production and home consumption
was "local in character," and its effects upon interstate commerce were "at
most indirect., 214 Such activities, argued Filburn, were beyond the reach
of the federal commerce power.
The government argued that controlling the total available supply of
wheat-including wheat consumed on the farm-was necessary to
regulate both the amount of wheat marketed and the interstate price
structure.215 Wheat consumed on the farm was not "economically
separable" from the total supply of wheat available for marketing, which
meant that even wheat grown for home consumption had a substantial
effect on interstate prices.216 Furthermore, the more wheat that farmers
grew and consumed on the farm, the less wheat that farmers would
purchase commercially. 217 Only by addressing the economic relationship
between the home consumption of wheat and the interstate price of wheat
could Congress hope to achieve its goal of preventing an excessive supply
from driving down prices to levels ruinous to the farmer.21i
In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled in favor of the government.
Focusing on the "economics of the wheat industry"-including the extent
of commerce between wheat-importing and wheat-exporting states, the
impact of foreign production and import restrictions on the national
market, and regional variations in the use of wheat among American
211. Filburn v. Helke, 43 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1942).
212. Chen, Filburn 's Legacy, supra note 210, at 1737.
213. Id. at 1740.
214. Wickardv. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 119 (1942).
215. Brief for the Appellants on Reargument, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (No. 59),
1942 WL 75715, *18-21.
216. Id.at*10,22,25.
217. Id. at *18 ("in general, the more wheat is consumed on the farm where grown[,] the less will
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farmers-the Court found that home-consumed wheat had a "substantial
influence" on price and market conditions.2 19 Such influence was enough
to subject even "local" activities to the federal commerce power. "[T]he
power to regulate commerce," emphasized the Court, "includes the power
to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in
and practices affecting such prices."22 Since growing wheat for
consumption on the farm was a practice affecting wheat prices,
homegrown wheat was a valid object of congressional regulation under the
Commerce Clause.
Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court provides a compelling example
of legal realist thinking in judicial decision-making. All four features of
the realist movement discussed in Part I manifest themselves in Wickard:
skepticism of rigid legal rules; application of a functional approach to law
focused on social consequences; use of the social sciences-in particular
economic principles-to inform legal reasoning; and a willingness to defer
to legislative purpose. The result was an opinion that produced the most
expansive interpretation of congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce in the Court's history.
C. The Wickard Opinion: A Lesson in Applied Realism
The Court's rule skepticism set the tone for the Wickard opinion and
ultimately cleared the path to upholding congressional regulation of an
activity-growing wheat for home consumption-that was neither
interstate nor commerce. At the outset of his discussion of "the course of
decision under the Commerce Clause," Justice Jackson made clear that
legal categories that had been developed and sanctioned by the Court for
deciding Commerce Clause cases in the past would no longer be used to
set the bounds of the commerce power.22" ' In doing so, Justice Jackson was
signaling an intent to reframe the Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, which up to that point had been characterized by
categorical thinking to determine what kind of economic activity fell
within the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Justice
Jackson argued that these categories-local-national, direct-indirect,
production-commerce-had contributed little to legal analysis because
they were divorced from economic reality. "[Q]uestions of the power of
Congress," wrote Justice Jackson, "are not to be decided by reference to
any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature such as
'production' and 'indirect' and foreclose consideration of the actual
effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce. 222
Evidence of the thinking behind the Court's dismissal of artificial legal
219. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128.
220. Id.
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categories in Wickard could be found in memoranda Justice Jackson wrote
to his law clerk in the summer of 1942, months before oral argument. 23
Even at that early stage, Justice Jackson expressed open skepticism of the
utility of the legal standards the Court had used in recent Commerce
Clause cases. The direct-indirect distinction, for example, was a "judicial
shibboleth" with "almost no value for weighing economic effects and for
applying them to the commerce power. ' 24 Furthermore, in a complex,
highly integrated national economy, Justice Jackson believed it was nearly
impossible to formulate workable criteria for distinguishing "local" from
"interstate" economic activity. "In such a state of affairs," he wrote to his
clerk, "the determination of the limit [of the commerce power] is not a
matter of legal principle, but of personal opinion; not one of constitutional
law, but one of economic policy.
225
This lack of faith in the utility of judicially-created legal categories
echoed the realist critique of legal formalism expressed by Llewellyn,
Cohen, Radin, and others. Like the realists, Justice Jackson insisted that
"economic facts" rather than "legal formulae" had to drive judicial
decision-making. The legal distinctions that had emerged around the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence in an effort to preserve the
"logical machinery of the law" 226 were "neither consistent nor well
defined '227 and thus should not be given deference. As Justice Jackson put
it in a seemingly realist-inspired passage of his opinion, "Whether the
subject of the regulation in question [i.e., wheat grown and consumed on
the farm] was 'production,' 'consumption,' or 'marketing' is, therefore,
not material for deciding the question of federal power before us.",228 For
the Court, these labels had become a type of "transcendental nonsense. 229
The Court's emphasis in Wickard on economic effects over "technical
legal conceptions"230 highlights the second characteristic of realism that
comes through in the opinion-the idea that questions of law should be
resolved with a view toward social consequences. Realism's
consequentialist orientation was, of course, a corollary of its rule-
skepticism-a consideration of social effects was thought to fill the gap
left by analytically empty legal concepts. Justice Jackson adopted and
applied this consequentialist view in setting out the standard that should be
used to resolve the constitutionality of the marketing quota provisions of
the Act. In one of the opinion's most memorable passages, Justice Jackson
made clear that consequences, not categories, were the touchstone:
223. CUSHMAN, supra note 181, at 216-220.
224. Id. at 217.
225. Id.
226. Arnold, supra note 35, at 803.
227. CUSHMAN, supra note 181, at 217 n.53.
228. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124.
229. See Cohen, supra note 16.
230. Id. at 122.
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But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what
might at some earlier time have been defined as "direct" or
"indirect." 23 '
The test, then, was whether homegrown wheat exerted a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. The Court undertook a four-page exegesis of the
economics of the wheat industry-both national and global-to show that
wheat grown and consumed on the farm did have such an effect.232 This
effect stemmed from regional variations in crop usage between farmers in
wheat-exporting and wheat-importing states. The data in the record
indicated that "consumption of homegrown wheat... constitute[d] the
most variable factor in the disappearance of the wheat crop. 2 33 Justice
Jackson noted that such consumption "appear[ed] to vary in an amount
greater than 20 percent of average production. 234
Controlling this consumption was thus the critical factor in realizing the
price control purposes of the Act-the government would find it nearly
impossible to regulate the interstate price of wheat if some farmers could
simply increase their consumption of homegrown wheat and opt out of the
market altogether. Homegrown wheat and wheat in interstate commerce
were not economically separable; consumption of the former inevitably
impacted the price of the latter. The Court summarized the point this way:
[B]eing in marketable condition [homegrown] wheat overhangs the
market and if induced by rising prices tends to flow into the market
and check price increases. But if we assume that it is never
marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it which would
otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market. Home-
grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce.235
Clearly, then, the question for Justice Jackson was not whether
precedent allowed for homegrown wheat to be regulated via the commerce
power; the question was whether not regulating homegrown wheat would
thwart the primary purposes of the policy-to increase the market price of
wheat and, to that end, limit the volume that could affect the market.236
Framing the legal issue this way allowed the Court to interpret the scope
of the government's regulatory power with much more flexibility, and in a
way that placed questions of social policy at the forefront of the Court's
analysis. By adopting this kind of framework-a functional approach
centered on the impact of homegrown wheat on policy-Justice Jackson
231. Id. at 125.
232. Id. at 125-128.
233. Id. at 127.
234. Id.
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was invoking one of the essential features of the realist program. This
policy-oriented approach was captured well in the conclusion of the
Court's Commerce Clause analysis. "This record leaves us in no doubt,"
wrote Justice Jackson, "that Congress may properly have considered that
wheat consumed on the farm where grown if wholly outside the scheme of
regulation would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its
purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased prices."237
Another characteristic of realist thought that featured prominently in the
Wickard opinion was the use of the social sciences to inform judicial
decision-making. In Wickard, Justice Jackson brought economic principles
and data to the forefront of the Court's analysis. The point was not to use
economics to "invent new doctrine" or ignore "constitutional logic"-
something that realist and New Deal lawyer Thurman Arnold advised
against in his New Republic article238 -but instead to ensure that the
Court's analysis properly accounted for empirical reality. If questions of
law were best resolved with a full appreciation of the social facts upon
which the law was built, as the realists maintained, then the Court's
constitutional inquiry in Wickard had to be rooted in principles of supply
and demand and the economic realities that drove passage of the law in the
first place.
With farming data and economic principles at the center of the inquiry,
the Court could be confident its analysis reflected the facts on the ground.
The empirical reality also ensured that the Court would dismiss any claim
that Filburn, as a single farmer, could not by himself upset market
dynamics with his consumption of homegrown wheat. In the Court's view,
the unit of analysis was not Filburn as an individual farmer, but rather all
farmers who might engage in a similar consumption pattern-a
consumption pattern that the challenged provisions were specifically
designed to prevent. As Justice Jackson explained in a particularly
noteworthy paragraph of the opinion:
The maintenance by government regulation of a price for wheat
undoubtedly can be accomplished as effectively by sustaining or
increasing the demand as by limiting supply. The effect of the
statute before us is to restrict the amount which may be produced
for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort
to the market by producing to meet his own needs. That appellee's
own contribution to demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is
not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation
where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many
others similarly situated, is far from trivial.239
In microeconomic terms, the Court was recognizing that Filburn's
237. Id. at 128-29.
238. See Arnold, supra note 116.
239. Id. at 127-28.
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consumption, if aggregated, would produce a market demand curve that
would defeat the purposes of the Act. The relationship between an
individual demand curve and market demand curve, and the effect of a
market demand curve on market price, are of course, the stuff of
microeconomics.24 ° This is not to say that the Wickard Court conducted its
own independent economic analysis; Justice Jackson strongly believed
that such an undertaking lay outside the province of the Court. But Justice
Jackson seemed to take seriously the notion that the integration of social
science and law would lead to a decision better aligned to social reality.
"[W]e ground our decision on the realities disclosed," wrote Justice
Jackson in a memorandum to the other Justices, "which afford no basis for
judicial denial to Congress of the power to extend its regulation to the
production of wheat not intended for commerce or sale."2 4 1
The Court's nod to empirical economics in Wickard, even as the Court
refrained from conducting its own independent economic analysis,
highlights the final feature of legal realism highlighted by the Wickard
opinion-a belief in the importance of judicial deference to legislative
purpose. This was a notion Justice Jackson preached even before his
appointment to the Supreme Court. In The Struggle for Judicial
Supremacy, Jackson emphasized that the legislature was due substantial
deference on questions of government policy because it was the branch of
government that most directly reflected the views of a "dynamic
people." '242 The outcome of the legislative process, Jackson noted, was the
"democratic conciliation of [contemporary] social and economic
conflicts" 243-the result of a collective struggle among the people to
define social policy. The Court, on the other hand, was "almost never a
really contemporary institution." '244 The combination of life tenure in the
judiciary, and the short election intervals of the Congress, meant that "the
average viewpoint of the two institutions" was usually "a generation
apart." '245 Judicial modesty was critical, Jackson believed, to ensuring the
legislature could meet the urgent needs of modem society without
interference from an out-of-touch judiciary.246
The views on institutional competence that Jackson expressed in The
Struggle for Judicial Supremacy were an important part of his decision-
making in Wickard. Both in the opinion itself and in memoranda on the
case, Justice Jackson made clear his belief that it was not the judiciary's
role to second-guess economic policy decisions reached by the
240. AUSTAN GOOLSBEE ET AL., MICROECONOMICS 165 203 (2012).
241. CUSHMAN, supra note 181, at 221 n.86.
242. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 315 (1941).
243. Id. at 321.
244. Id. at 315.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 288, 295, 320.
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legislature.247 For Justice Jackson, the Court's role was to ensure that there
was a substantial relationship between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce. Other issues, such as whether some farmers benefited more
than others from the Act's marketing quota provisions, was no concern of
the Court. "The conflicts of economic interest between the regulated and
those who advantage by it," wrote Justice Jackson in Wickard, "are wisely
left under our system to resolution by the Congress under its more flexible
and responsible legislative process. ' ' 248 It was the Congress, not the Court,
that was best equipped to resolve debates of economic policy.
Justice Jackson was clear-eyed about the far-reaching implications of
his views. Judicial deference to legislative purpose on questions of
economic policy would all but remove the Court from playing the primary
role in deciding the scope of the federal commerce power. Justice Jackson,
however, was undeterred. He was convinced that a more explicit
recognition of judicial deference was the natural outgrowth of recent
developments in the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, even as the
Court had tried to maintain a pretense of review. 249 In Justice Jackson's
view, it was much better for the Court to frankly acknowledge that judicial
standards had little applicability to questions involving the intersection of
economic regulatory policy and the commerce power. "We have all but
reached an era in the interpretation of the [C]ommerce [C]lause," wrote
Justice Jackson to his law clerk, "of candid recognition that we have no
legal judgment upon economic effects which we can oppose to the policy
judgment made by Congress in legislation. '250 Justice Jackson repeated
this sentiment in a letter written to then-Circuit Judge Sherman Minton
explaining his Wickard opinion. "All of the efforts to set up formulae to
confine the commerce power have failed," wrote Justice Jackson. "When
we admit that it is an economic matter, we pretty nearly admit that it is not
a matter which courts may judge."' 251
Justice Jackson's insistence in Wickard on judicial deference to
Congress also reflected his deeper conviction that the success of the New
Deal required a more flexible-minded judiciary. As a prominent New
Dealer before his appointment to the Court, Jackson had defended New
Deal policies in litigation and believed that the government should enjoy
the freedom of action needed to respond to the unprecedented economic
crisis. For Justice Jackson, a legal philosophy that looked backward to
precedent was ill-suited to the demands of the times. "In dealing with a
nation whose genius is invention," Jackson said in a speech he delivered
as Assistant Attorney General of the Justice Department, "we cannot
247. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942).
248. Id. at 126.
249. CUSHMAN, supra note 181, at 217-18.
250. Id. at 217 n.60.
251. Id. at221 n.87.
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outlaw every action that cannot show a precedent. 252 In Jackson's view,
lawyers rooted in old ways of thinking were tying up "many major
policies of government in legal doubts," undermining effective
enforcement of important public policies. 253 Such obstructionism was
detrimental to responsive government. "Judicial review of social policy,"
Jackson wrote in The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, "load[ed] the dice
in favor of the status quo and [made] the constructive task of liberal
leadership impossible." '254 The New Deal could survive only if judges "let
the realities of life influence ... legal decisions ' 255 and refrained from




This Note has argued that the New Deal was central to realist
jurisprudence and should be used to define it. The New Deal allowed
proponents of realism to "operationalize" realist jurisprudence by putting
its tenets into practice, while also allowing realist theoreticians to consider
the implications of realism in new areas, such as constitutional and
administrative law. It was realism that provided the theoretical
justification for allowing the New Deal to guide the scope of the
government's regulatory authority under the Constitution, as opposed to
letting the Constitution constrain the New Deal. It was realism that helped
provide the rationale for the rise of the administrative state. Those who
would downplay the relationship between realism and the New Deal as a
mere coincidence of ideas have not cast their analytical lens wide enough.
Without the New Deal, we would be left with little understanding of
realism's impact on public law and its effect on judicial decision-making.
Justice Jackson's Wickard opinion provides a compelling example of
how the New Deal allowed realism to "reframe the spatial boundaries of
law" '257 in a way that might otherwise not have been possible. The
government sought to regulate an activity that was neither interstate, nor
commerce, nor in the "stream" of commerce, and Jackson, applying realist
principles, upheld this unprecedented expansion of the federal commerce
power. In the opinion, the Court criticized the categorical thinking that had
previously characterized its Commerce Clause jurisprudence; it adopted a
functional approach focused on social context; it incorporated empirical
research; and it showed deference to legislative purpose and expertise.
252. Robert Jackson, Address Before the New York Bar Association (Jan. 29, 1937), in 81 CONG.
REC. Appendix 123, 124 (1937).
253. Id.
254. JACKSON, supra note 242, at 320.
255. Jackson, supra note 252, at 124.
256. JACKSON, supra note 242, at 175.
257. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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Wickard, in short, was a realist decision. It was a decision that allowed for
an examination of realism's impact on constitutional jurisprudence. And it
was a decision that arguably would not have occurred but for the
application of realist principles to the New Deal policy agenda.
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